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financial support of this research.etween 1979 and 2004, real gross domestic product (GDP) per person
in the United States increased about 60 percent. This report asks how well
the U.S. economy has done translating this economic growth into good jobs.
The report defines a  “good” job as one that offers decent pay (at least $16
per hour or about $32,000 per year), employer-paid health insurance, and a
pension. In 2004 (the most recent year for which data are available), only
25.2 percent of American workers had a job that met all three criteria.
In both 1979 and 2004, about one-fourth of workers were in jobs that
qualified as “good” by the definition used here.  The basically unchanged
good jobs rate across the two years suggests that the economy has failed to
convert long-term economic growth into an expanding supply of good jobs.
After controlling for improvements between 1979 and 2004 in the “human
capital” of the U.S. workforce —American workers today are, on average,
older and much better educated than they were at the end of the 1970s—
the economy now produces 25 to 30 percent fewer good jobs than it did 25
years ago.
In 2004, about one-fourth (26.6 percent) of Americans were in “bad” jobs,
defined as a job that pays less than $16, has no employer-provided health
insurance, and no pension. This is close to the share of Americans in bad
jobs in 1979 (27.9 percent).
If anything, the analysis presented here may paint an overly optimistic pic-
ture of the current economy’s capacity to generate high-quality employment.
The data used here for health insurance and pensions do not allow us to
control for declines in the quality of many employer-provided health-insur-
ance plans (most importantly the rise in the employee share of the cost of
such plans) or for declines in the quality of pension plans (especially the shift
from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans).
Executive Summary
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BThe U.S. economy is much richer today than it was at the end of the 1970s.
On a per person basis, inflation-adjusted national income grew from about
$24,000 in 1979 to about $38,500 in 2004.1 As a result, on average,
Americans are 60 percent richer today than they were at the end of the
1970s.2 The main question examined in this report is how well the U.S.
economy has done in converting this economic bonanza into good jobs.
The short answer is “not very well.” If we define a “good” job as one that
pays at least $16 dollars per hour, offers health insurance that is at least
partly paid by the employer, and provides a pension plan, then the share of
U.S. workers in good jobs hardly changed between 1979 (24.6 percent)
and 2004 (25.2 percent), despite the 60 percent increase in income per
person over the same period. More importantly, if we control for significant
improvements in the human capital of the U.S. workforce —today’s
workforce is, on average, significantly older and much better-educated than
the country’s workforce at the end of the 1970s— the economy’s ability to
generate good jobs has actually fallen by about 25 to 30 percent.
Introduction
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1 According to the BLS (2005a), Table 1, GDP per capita (in constant 2002 dollars) in
1979 was $23,922; in 2004, it was $38,392.
2 Without information about how the distribution of income has changed over the
period, of course, what has happened to the “average” American doesn’t necessarily
tell us anything about what has happened to “typical” Americans. The U.S. economy
became markedly more unequal over the period analyzed here. See, for example, Mishel,
Bernstein, and Allegretto (2005).time since the survey includes data on individuals’
earnings from work, employer-provided health-
insurance coverage, and participation in employer-
operated pension plans.
Hourly Earnings
To qualify as a “good” job in this analysis, a job
must pay at least $16 per hour, or about $32,000
on an annual basis. That pay rate —which is set in
inflation-adjusted 2004 dollars— corresponds to
the median hourly pay for men in 1979. In prac-
tice, then, a good job must pay, in inflation-ad-
justed terms, at least as much as the typical male
earned at the end of the 1970s.3
Workers’ hourly earnings in the calendar year be-
fore the March CPS are calculated from the CPS
data by dividing individuals’ reported annual earn-
ings from work by their estimated annual hours at
work. Annual hours at work are estimated by
multiplying the total number of weeks worked dur-
ing the year by the usual number of hours worked
per week. If the resulting estimated hourly wage is
$16 per hour or higher, then the worker’s job meets
the pay cutoff for a good job.
Health Insurance
A “good” job must also offer employer- (or union-
) provided health insurance, paid at least in part
by the employer. While the March CPS asks an
extensive set of questions about individuals’ health-
insurance coverage through both private and pub-
lic sources, the available information on private cov-
erage falls short of the ideal for both conceptual
and practical reasons. For 1979 through 2004,
on a consistent basis, the March CPS asked
whether an individual was covered by an employer-
(or union-) provided health-insurance plan and, if
Defining a good job is not an easy task. Any
definition must appear reasonable to a diverse
group of observers including economic
policymakers, employers, and employees
themselves. In addition, if we want to trace
the development of good jobs over time, the
definition must build on the specific labor-
market information that is available in large,
nationally representative data sets such as the
Current Population Survey (the source of
official monthly data on the national
unemployment rate, as well as many other
indicators of the state of the labor market).
This report uses a simple definition of a good
job, based on three job characteristics: pay,
health insurance, and pension benefits. Of
course, these are not the only factors that
would enter into a complete determination of
whether a particular job is good. Other
important job features would include the
schedule, the amount of paid vacation and sick
leave, the degree of job security, the level of
on-the-job health and safety protections, the
availability of family-friendly policies, and
many others. Unfortunately, available labor-
market data do not allow a consistent analysis
of any of these important aspects of job quality
over time.
Even if we limit the analysis to pay, health
insurance, and pension benefits, reasonable
people could differ about the particular level
of pay or benefits that reaches the threshold
of a good job. The rest of this section lays
out the specifics of the working definition of a
good job used here, and discusses some of
the practical issues involved in using the March
Current Population Survey (CPS) data to
measure job quality. The March CPS, which
is the main national source of family income,
poverty, and health-insurance coverage data,
is uniquely suited to measuring job quality over
The Data and the Definition of a Good Job
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3 The exact hourly pay rate used is $15.97 per hour, from











25 to 30 percent
fewer good jobs
than it did 25
years ago.indicator used here does not capture any of these
likely deteriorations in the quality of health-insur-
ance over time. As a result, the indicator likely
overstates the quality of jobs in later years, thereby
overstating the progress the economy has made
in improving job quality.
Over the period analyzed here, the health-insur-
ance related questions in the March CPS under-
went several changes. At least two of these
changes could affect the consistency of measures
of health-insurance coverage. Beginning in March
1995 (covering data for calendar year 1994) the
use of computer-assisted interviewing techniques
allowed interviewers to probe respondents’ an-
swers to questions about private-health-insurance
coverage. The new technique resulted in a signifi-
cant increase in private-coverage rates. The data
used here for 1994 through 2003, which are taken
from the Unicon extract of the March CPS data,
“were recoded to their equivalent [pre-March-
1995] fields based on the set of questions that
had previously been used.”5 Beginning in March
2000 (covering data for calendar year 1999), the
CPS introduced an additional series of “verifica-
tion” questions asked of respondents who re-
ported no coverage throughout the year after the
standard set of CPS questions. The new verifica-
tion questions increased overall health-insurance
coverage rates substantially relative to the earlier
standard.6 The upward shift in private-coverage
rates in 1999, however, is likely to be small since
the methodological change had its biggest impact
on publicly provided health insurance, particularly
coverage for children.
While the March CPS health-insurance measure
is not perfect, it provides a basically consistent
measure of employer-paid health-insurance cov-
erage from 1979 through 2004. Several recent
so, whether the employer pays all, part, or none
of the premiums for that plan.
The most important limitation of the survey for
the present analysis is the lack of detailed in-
formation on the “quality” of the employer (or
union’s) health-insurance plan.4 The March
CPS does not report the exact share of the costs
of the health-insurance plan that is paid by em-
ployers. Instead, the CPS indicates whether the
employer paid “all,” “part,” or “none” of the
premium; and the CPS provides no consistent
information on other important aspects of
health-insurance plans including deductible pay-
ments, co-payments, choice of doctors, ease
of referrals, or the extent of coverage. The data
that are available in the March CPS raise some
concerns that the “quality” of health-insurance
plans may have deteriorated in recent years. In
particular, the share of employees whose em-
ployer pays the full cost of health-insurance pre-
miums fell substantially over the 1979-2004
period. As late as 1983, about 28 percent of
workers were enrolled in employer- (or union-
) sponsored health-insurance plans where the
employer paid all of the associated premiums.
By 2004, the share in fully-paid plans had
dropped to 12 percent. Over the same period,
the share of workers in plans where the em-
ployer paid only part of the premiums rose from
33 percent to 43 percent. In recent years, cost-
cutting has also led many employers to shift from
plans with freedom of choice with respect to
doctors and specialists, as well as low (even
no) deductibles and co-payments, to health-
maintenance-organization style plans that re-
strict patients’ freedom to choose doctors and
specialists and generally include higher
deductibles and co-payments. The “good jobs”
How Good is the Economy at Creating Good Jobs?! 4
4 Measuring quality is particularly tricky in this con-
text. The main interest here is in the quality of the
health-insurance plan, not in the underlying
medical attention paid for by the plan. Given ad-
vancements in medical technology, drugs, and medi-
cal practices, the quality of medical attention offered
by any given plan would undoubtedly be significantly
higher in 2004 than was the case in 1979.
5 Unicon (2005), Appendix T. The data used for 2004 in
this analysis come directly from the 2005 March CPS,
coded to match the Unicon procedure.
6 According to the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and
the Uninsured (2004), the verification questions raised
the overall health-insurance coverage count by 3.5 mil-
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capture the substantial transformation in the na-
ture of private pensions in recent years. The
entire period 1979-2004 has seen a steady
decline in the share of workers in defined-ben-
efit pension plans, where employers guaran-
tee a specified level of income upon retirement,
and an equivalent rise in the share of workers
in defined-contribution plans, where employ-
ers pay a specified amount of money into a
worker’s personal retirement account. Among
private-sector workers, for example, in 1979,
about 38 percent of workers were in defined-
benefit plans8; by 2005, the share had fallen to
21 percent. Over the same period, the portion
of private-sector workers in defined-contri-
bution plans rose from about 7 percent to 42
percent.9
The shift from defined-benefit to defined-con-
tribution plans represents a substantial shift in
risk from employers to employees, but is not
reflected in the “good” jobs indicator. As a re-
sult, the “good” jobs indicator analyzed here
probably overstates the quality of jobs in re-
cent years, relative to earlier periods.
A Bad Job
This report also briefly analyzes trends in “bad”
jobs, defined here as a job that pays less than
the $16 per hour cutoff for a good job, and
has no paid, employer-provided health insur-
ance, and has no employer-sponsored pen-
sion plan.
improvements to the CPS may increase the share
of workers with employer-paid coverage in re-
cent years relative to what those shares would
have been in earlier years, but the size of the ef-
fect is likely to be small. To the extent that any
significant bias remains, it would tend to increase
the share of workers in “good” jobs in more re-
cent years.7
Pension
In addition to paying at least $16 per hour and
offering employer-paid health insurance, a good
job must also provide a pension plan. An ideal
measure of pensions would take into account the
vesting period, the expected level of retirement
income, the amount of risk borne by the indi-
vidual worker, and other factors. Unfortunately,
the March CPS data do not track any of these
characteristics over time. Instead, the analysis
here counts a worker as having a pension if the
employee reports participating in an employer-
sponsored pension plan, regardless of the char-
acteristics of the plan.
In the current context, the biggest drawback to
the March CPS pension variable is its failure to
7 Another limitation of the CPS data, which is more
important in other contexts, is the somewhat ambigu-
ous time frame for employer-provided coverage. In
principle, the CPS asks individuals whether they had
continuous coverage through the calendar year pre-
ceding their March interview. Research, however, sug-
gests that respondents may treat the question, instead,
as referring either to most of the preceding calendar
year or to a particular point-in-time (especially, the job
they hold at the time of the March interview).  To the
extent that this interpretation of the coverage ques-
tions has been relatively constant over the period 1979-
2004, any resulting bias would be relatively constant
over time, leaving estimates of  changes  in coverage
unbiased. In any event, we are interested in whether
the workers’ job had employer-paid health insurance,
and only secondarily in whether this coverage was
continuous throughout the year. As a result, this flaw
in the March CPS survey is less of a concern here than
it might be in other contexts.
8 Especially in recent years, a significant portion of
the plans categorized by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics as defined-benefit plans  are “cash balance”
plans, which guarantee workers a rate of return for
their retirement savings, but not a specific income
level in retirement.
9 For the 1979 figure, see Mishel, Bernstein, and Al-
legretto (2005), Figure 2G; for 2005, see Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2005b), p. 1. In both cases, the un-
derlying data include workers that have both defined-







the 1970s.Table 1 reports trends in “good” and “bad” jobs
from 1979 through 2004, the most recent year
available. In order to control for the effects of
the business cycle on comparisons over time, the
table reports data for the three business cycle
peaks —1979, 1989, and 2000— as well as
the fourth year after each of the peaks —1983,
1993, and 2004. In 2004, 25.2 percent of the
workforce were in a “good” job, just above the
24.6 percent share that were in good jobs in 1979.
The good jobs share in 2004 was higher than it
had been at comparable points in earlier busi-
ness cycles: 22.9 percent in 1983 and 21.7 per-
cent in 1993. At first glance, the small increase
(0.6 percentage points) over the entire 1979 to
Good Job Trends
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2004 period, and the slightly better improve-
ments across comparable points in the last two
business cycles (2.3 to 3.5 percentage points),
suggest that the economy has improved its ca-
pacity to generate good jobs. These modest
gains, however, should be set against the 60
percent increase in national income per capita
over the period. Moreover, these “raw” num-
bers do not control for the substantial im-
provements in technology, increases in the size
of the capital stock, or the age and educa-
tional attainment of the workforce. As we will
see below, controlling for increases in the age
and education of the workforce paints a sub-
stantially different picture.
TABLE 1
Share of good jobs and bad jobs, 1979-2004
(percent)











Notes: Analysis of March Current Population Survey, 1980-2005. Years
1979, 1989, and 2000 are labor-market peaks; 1983, 1993, and 2004 are
four years peaks. “Good” jobs pay at least $16 per hour (in constant
$2004); have health insurance that is fully or partially paid by the
employer; and a pension plan in which the employee participates. “Bad”
jobs pay less than $16 per hour (in constant  $2004); offer no paid
health insurance; and do not have a pension plan in which the employee
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Age
Table 2 shows the trend in good jobs for three
separate age groups: 18-to-34 year olds, 35-
to-54 year olds, and 55-to-64 year olds. The
most remarkable feature of the table is that,
between 1979 and 2004, the share of good
jobs declines for all three age groups: from 16.2
percent to 14.1 percent for 18-to-34 year olds;
from 34.1 percent to 31.3 percent for 35-to-
54 year olds; and (just barely) from 33.1 per-
cent to 33.0 percent for 55-to-64 year olds.
As we saw above, the overall share of good
jobs rose slightly over the same period. The
only way for the good jobs share to rise for the
population as a whole at the same time that the
good jobs share is falling for all three subgroups,
is if the composition of the population is shifting
over time toward subgroups that have a higher
share of good jobs. In fact, between 1979 and
2004, the median age of the 18-to-64 year-old
workforce rose 7 years (from 33 to 40), push-
ing a significant portion of the population out of
the 18-to-34 age group, which has the lowest
share of good jobs, into the 35-to-54 year
group, which has the highest share of good jobs.
Even Table 2’s simple effort to control for the
aging of the population substantially alters our
perception of the economy’s capacity to gen-
erate good jobs. Over the full 1979-2004 pe-
TABLE 2




1979 16.2 34.1 33.1
1983 13.6 32.6 32.9
1989 13.0 32.5 30.7
1993 11.5 30.5 27.9
2000 14.4 32.2 31.8
2004 14.1 31.3 33.0
Change (percentage-point)
1983-2004 0.5 -1.3 0.1
1993-2004 2.6 0.8 5.1
1979-2004 -2.1 -2.8 -0.1
(b) Bad jobs
1979 34.7 20.3 20.9
1983 38.5 20.4 20.5
1989 40.8 20.9 21.8
1993 43.8 21.1 21.1
2000 40.2 18.0 17.2
2004 40.8 19.0 15.8
Change (percentage-point)
1983-2004 2.3 -1.4 -4.7
1993-2004 -3.0 -2.1 -5.3
1979-2004 6.1 -1.3 -5.1



















shift in risk from
employers to
employees.riod, the economy’s ability to create good jobs
for younger and middle-aged workers fell sub-
stantially, by 2.1 percentage points for 18-to-
34 year olds and 2.8 percentage points for 35-
to-54 year olds. At comparable points in the
business cycle, the 2004 performance was
somewhat better, but still worse than suggested
by the overall numbers without any controls in
Table 1. Between 1993 and 2004, for example,
the share of workers in good jobs rose 2.6 per-
centage points for younger workers, 0.8 per-
centage points for middle-aged workers, and
5.1 percentage points for older workers, com-
pared to  a 3.5 percentage-point increase over-
all. Between 1983 and 2004, the share of good
jobs rose 0.5 percentage points for younger
workers, fell 1.3 percentage points for middle-
aged workers, and rose 0.1 percentage points
for older workers, compared to a 2.3 percent-
age-point increase for the workforce as a whole.
The results in Table 2 suggest that even if the
underlying economy in 2004 had been identical
to how it was in 1979, the aging of the
workforce would have increased the share of
good jobs overall, simply because, on average,
the older workforce in 2004 would have been
more likely to be in a good job than the younger
workforce was back in 1979. We will see be-
low that controlling more formally for the ef-
fects of age (and education) reverse all of the
economy’s apparent gains in job quality.
Education
Table 3 presents trends in good jobs for work-
ers with four different levels of formal educa-
tion: less than a high school degree, a high school
degree, some college (but not a four-year de-
gree), and a four-year-college degree or more.
The likelihood of being in a good job depends
heavily on a worker’s level of education. In
2004, for example, the share of workers in a
good job varied from fewer than one in 20 work-
ers (4.4 percent) with less than a high school
degree, to about one in six (15.8 percent) high-
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school graduates, to about one in four (23.4
percent) with some college, to almost half (43.5
percent) of workers with a four-year-college
degree or more.
Over the full 1979-to-2004 period, the change
in the good-jobs share also depended heavily
on education level. Good jobs fell dramatically
for workers with lower levels of education, and
improved slightly for workers with higher lev-
els of education. For those with less than a high-
school degree, for example, the good-jobs
share declined 11.6 percentage points; for those
with a high-school degree, but no further edu-
cation, the good-jobs share fell 6.7 percentage
points. Meanwhile, good jobs increased 1.1
percentage points for workers with some col-
lege education and 1.8 percentage points for
workers with a four-year college degree or
more.
The change in good jobs is more positive across
comparable points in the business cycle. Be-
tween 1983 (four years after the 1979 peak)
and 2004 (four years after the 2000 peak), the
decline in good jobs was smaller or the im-
provement was larger for all four education
groups than was the case for the full 1979-2004
period. The data also show a modest improve-
ment between 1993 (four years after the 1989
peak) and 2004 for all but the bottom educa-
tion category.
Between 1979 and 2004, job quality deterio-
rated sharply for less-educated workers and
increased only marginally for better-educated
workers. As we saw above with the trends in
good jobs by age, an important part of the slight
overall improvement in the good-jobs share
stemmed from a decline in the portion of work-
ers with lower levels of education —and thus
lower shares of good jobs— and a corre-
sponding rise in the portion of workers with
higher levels of education —and thus higher













Share of good jobs and bad jobs, by education, 1979-2004
(percent)
Less than HS High School Some college College+
(a) Good jobs
1979 16.0 22.5 22.3 41.7
1983 12.3 19.5 20.0 40.8
1989 8.5 18.3 20.8 41.1
1993 5.4 15.5 19.4 40.8
2000 5.0 16.8 22.6 45.2
2004 4.4 15.8 23.4 43.5
Change (percentage-point)
1983-2004 -7.9 -3.7 3.4 2.7
1993-2004 -1.0 0.3 4.0 2.7
1979-2004 -11.6 -6.7 1.1 1.8
(b) Bad jobs
1979 38.4 26.7 32.2 13.1
1983 43.6 29.4 34.7 13.1
1989 51.7 31.5 34.2 12.2
1993 56.8 35.0 33.0 12.2
2000 56.5 31.1 28.0 9.3
2004 58.6 32.3 27.4 9.9
Change (percentage-point)
1983-2004 15.0 2.9 -7.3 -3.2
1993-2004 1.8 -2.7 -5.6 -2.3
1979-2004 20.2 5.6 -4.8 -3.2
Notes: See notes to Table 1. Education categories follow recommendationsby Jaeger
(1997) across coding change between 1991 and 1992.
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Bad Jobs
Tables 1, 2, and 3 also report the share of workers in “bad”
jobs (ones that pay less than $16 per hour, don’t offer health
insurance, and don’t offer a pension). In 2004, slightly more
U.S. workers were in bad jobs (26.6 percent) than were in
good jobs (25.2 percent). In the same year, the share of
workers in bad jobs declined with both age and education.
About 41 percent of younger workers were in bad jobs,
compared to about 19 percent of middle-aged and about
16 percent of older workers. Meanwhile, almost 60 per-
cent of workers with less than a high-school degree were in
a bad job, compared to about one-third of high school
graduates, and about 10 percent of workers with a college
degree or more. Even among workers with some college
education, more workers were likely to be in a bad job
(27.4 percent) than in a good job (23.4 percent).
Between 1979 and 2004, the overall share of workers in
bad jobs declined slightly (1.3 percentage points). The
change in the bad-jobs share over the period varied greatly
by age and education level. The share of workers in bad
jobs increased for younger workers (up 6.1 percentage
points), workers with less than a high-school degree (up
20.2 percentage points), and the high-school educated (up
5.6 percentage points). Over the same period, the bad-
jobs share fell for middle-aged workers (down 1.3 per-
centage points), older workers (down 5.1 percentage
points), workers with some college education (down 4.8
percentage points), and a four-year-college degree or more










Controlling for Improvements in the Labor Force
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The main question examined in this report is
how well the U.S. economy has done in
converting economic growth into good jobs.
Given that capita income has increased more
than 60 percent in real terms since the end of
the 1970s, we would expect that the economy
would be able to generate many more good
jobs now than it did then.10 National income is
up for at least three reasons. First, the capital
stock is much larger today than it was 25 years
ago. When workers work with more capital
they are generally more productive. Other things
equal, a trucker driving an 18-wheeler will
deliver more goods than one driving a pickup.
Second, on average, technological advances
have raised the productivity of the capital stock,
independent of any increase in the size of the
capital stock. Workers using electronic
spreadsheets on personal computers, for
example, are much more productive than
workers using paper spreadsheets and hand-
held calculators.
Third, on average, workers’ “human capital”
—their broadly measured skills— is today
much higher than it was in 1979. Today’s
workforce is older —and therefore more
experienced— and much better educated than
was the case 25 years ago. The magnitude of
the improvements is large, and has likely had a
large impact on average productivity. As
mentioned above, in the March CPS data for
the 18-to-64 year-old workforce analyzed
here, in 1979, the median age was only 33; by
2004, the median age had risen  7 full years to
40. Over the same period, the portion of U.S.
workforce with a four-year-college degree or
more grew from 18 percent to 29 percent, with
comparable declines in workers with less than
a high-school degree. All else constant, a more
experienced and better-educated workforce
will be more productive than one that is less-
experienced and less-educated.
In assessing changes in the underlying capacity
of the economy to generate good jobs, ideally,
we would like to control for the increase in the
capital stock, improvements in technology, and
the sharp rise in human capital. Unfortunately,
conceptual and data limitations make it difficult
to control for growth in the capital stock and
technological advances in the present analysis.
We can, however, take some steps to control
for the greater experience and higher levels of
educational attainment in the workforce over
time. Given that we are ignoring two of the most
important causes of productivity growth —a
greater capital stock and technological
progress— the procedure used below will only
control for part of the increase we would have
expected to see based on higher productivity.
Table 4 presents the results of a simple exercise
to control for the improvements in the
experience and education levels of the
workforce between 1979 and 2004. The
analysis involves dividing the entire workforce
into 12 education-and-age groups, based on
the four education categories (less than high
school, high school, some college, and college
or more) and three age ranges (18 to 34, 35 to
54, and 55 to 64) in Tables 2 and 3.
10 By historical standards, the last quarter century
has not seen particularly impressive increases in na-
tional growth. In fact, economic growth was much
stronger in the period from the end of World War II
through the end of the 1970s. The focus of this paper
is on the last 25 years because they are a period
marked by moderate economic growth and sharply
rising economic inequality.How Good is the Economy at Creating Good Jobs? ! 11
TABLE 4
Effects of aging population and educational upgrading on share of good jobs, 1979-2004
(percent)
1979 1979 2004 2004
Share of total Share with Share of total Share with
Education, age workforce good job workforce good job
Less than High school, 18-34 8.2 6.5 4.2 1.8
Less than High school, 35-54 8.4 22.0 4.0 6.1
Less than High school, 55-64 3.9 22.9 1.1 8.6
High school, 18-34 19.1 14.9 11.5 6.8
High school, 35-54 13.7 30.2 16.0 20.5
High school, 55-64 4.4 31.3 4.0 22.9
Some college, 18-34 15.8 14.6 12.2 11.0
Some college, 35-54 6.3 37.1 14.0 32.0
Some college, 55-64 1.8 38.6 3.5 32.0
College or more, 18-34 9.3 30.4 9.0 33.3
College or more, 35-54 7.3 52.9 16.2 47.8
College or more, 55-64 1.7 56.0 4.4 48.8
Total (actual) 100.0 24.6 100.0 25.2
Counterfactuals
1979 pop.; 2004 rates 17.9
2004 pop.; 1979 rates 31.3
Difference 6.1 -7.3
Notes: See notes to Table 1. Education categories follow recommendationsby Jaeger (1997)
across coding change between 1991 and 1992.
The first column shows the share of the workforce
in each of the 12 categories in 1979; the third
column shows the share in each of the categories in
2004. A comparison of these two columns illustrates
the scale of the “skills upgrading” that took place
between the two periods. In general, the share of
the less-educated and younger groups fell
substantially. Younger (18 to 34) workers with less
than a high-school degree, for example, fell from
8.4 percent of all workers in 1979 to 4.2 percent
of workers in 2004. The share of less-than-high-
school-educated workers fell for all ages (from 8.4
percent to 4.0 percent for 35-to-54 year olds, and
from 3.9 percent to 1.1 percent for 55-to-64 year
olds). The share of younger workers also fell for all
education levels (from 19.1 percent to 11.5 percent
for younger high-school graduates, from 15.8
percent to 12.2 percent for younger workers with
some college, and from 9.3 percent to 9.0 percent
of younger workers with a college degree or more).
The second column gives the share of each
education-and-age group that had a good job in
1979; the fourth column gives the share that had a
good job in 2004. A comparison of these two
columns shows how the economy’s capacity to
provide these different types of workers with a good
job changed over time. In 11 of the 12 education-How Good is the Economy at Creating Good Jobs? ! 12
assumptions, if the workforce in 2004 had
not been any older or any better educated
than it was in 1979, then only 17.9 percent
of workers —not 25.2 percent of workers—
would have been in good jobs in 2004. In
other words, all of the actual 0.6 percentage-
point increase in the good jobs share between
1979 and 2004 (from 24.6 percent to 25.2
percent) stemmed from improvements in
workers’ human capital; none of small
progress reflected an improvement in the
economy’s underlying ability to generate good
jobs. In fact, the large-scale upgrading of
human capital masked a substantial decline
—on the order of about 30 percent11— in
the underlying capacity of the economy to
generate good jobs.
The data in Table 4 can provide a second
estimate of the change in the economy’s
underlying ability to create good jobs. We
could, instead, calculate the overall average
good-jobs share that would have resulted
from using the 1979 good-jobs shares by
education-and-age groups with the older and
better-educated 2004 workforce. This
calculation involves applying the workforce
composition for 2004 (in column three) to
the good-jobs shares for 1979 (in column
two). The row marked “Counterfactuals /
2004 population; 1979 rates” gives the results
of this calculation: 31.3 percent. If the
economy, with its actual 2004 workforce, had
only been able to maintain the same ability to
create good jobs as it had in 1979, then the
share of good jobs in 2004 would have been
31.3 percent, or 6.1 percentage points higher
than it actually was in 2004. By this estimate,
between 1979 and 2004, the economy’s
and-age categories, the shares of workers
with a good job fell between 1979 and
2004. The only exception was an increase in
the share of young workers with a college
degree or more, who saw an increase from
30.4 percent in 1979 to 33.3 percent in 2004.
In most of the other cases, the declines within
education-and-age categories in the share of
workers in good jobs were large: from 22. 0
percent of middle-aged workers with less than
a high-school degree in 1979 to 6.1 percent
in 2004; from 30.2 percent to 20.5 percent of
middle-aged high-school graduates; and from
52.9 percent to 47.8 percent of middle-aged
college graduates, for example.
In the second and fourth columns of Table 4,
the row marked “Total (actual)” shows the
average share of good jobs across all
education-and-age categories. As in Table 1,
the average for the overall population was 24.6
percent in 1979 and 25.2 percent in 2004.
The layout of Table 4, however, makes clear
that the overall average is just the weighted-
average of the good-jobs shares for each of
the 12 education-and-age groups.
This property of the overall average —that it
is the weighted sum of the group averages—
effectively allows us to control for the change
in the education-and-age mix across the two
years. For example, if we apply the education-
and-age weights from 1979 to the 2004 data
on the share of good jobs within each
category, we can estimate what the overall
average share of good jobs would have been
in 2004 if the economy had not experienced
any “skills upgrading” after 1979. The result
of this calculation appears in the last column
of the table in the row labeled “Counterfactuals
/ 1979 population; 2004 rates.” Under these
11 Calculated as a 7.2 percent difference over a
base of 25.2 percent.





a good job fell
between 1979
and 2004.underlying capacity to generate good jobs fell
about 25 percent. (See Figure 1 for a summary
of the two counterfactual exercises.)
Both versions of this simple approach lead to the
same conclusion. The underlying capacity of the
economy to generate good jobs has declined 25-
30 percent over the last 25 years. The only reason
that the good jobs share has managed to hold its
own between 1979 and 2004 is because the
economy is working with a much better labor
force than it did at the end of the 1970s. If the
workforce had not experienced these dramatic
improvements, the share of good jobs would have
fallen 25-30 percent, despite large increases in
the capital stock per worker and significant
technological progress over the period.
Moreover, the 25-30 percent decline in the
underlying ability of the economy to create
good jobs is almost certainly an
underestimate since this calculation does not
control for the larger capital stock or
technological advances, both of which
should have made it much easier for the
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)The United States is a much richer country today than it was a quarter
of a century ago, but the economy produces almost an identical supply
of good jobs then as now. Only about one-fourth (25.2 percent) of
the workforce has a job that pays a decent wage and offers both a
health-insurance and a pension plan. A slightly higher portion of the
workforce (26.6 percent) is in a job that pays poorly and offers neither
health insurance nor a pension.
A simple exercise to control for improvements in the human capital of
the  workforce suggests that, over the last 25 years, the economy has
lost 25 to 30 percent of its capacity to generate good jobs. This is a
conservative estimate, since it does not factor in declines in the quality
of many employer-provided health-insurance plans (most importantly
the rise in the employee share of the cost of such plans) or  declines in
the quality of pension plans (especially the shift from defined-benefit
to defined-contribution plans).
Conclusion
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